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The Law of Law
Maria Dos Santos..Lee
Introduction
Philosophy or law? Cause or effect? Does Philosophy name the
laws through which things become known or are deemed as true,
or must Philosophy itself be compelled by a law; guarded by an
order that grants it the authority to write that such-ana-such is
indeed so? And what would be the nature of such a law? What
would name it as being 'true'? Philosophy? Another law? An
infinite regress in the orders of Philosophy and law? ... Can we
ever hope to arrive at an absolute origin in this schema, from
which knowledge or truth may begin?
Or have we perhaps misconstrued the nature ofPhilosophy
and this notion of law at its most abstract? Misaligned their
relation to each other? Were we perhaps in error to assert a
separation between the idea of Philosophy and this abstract
conception of law, by seeking to allocate them in the distinct
roles of 'cause' or 'effect'? Do they, rather, share one-and-thesame identity? Philosophy as law; a 'first-cause' - an uncausedcause - that announces itself in the very pronouncement of the
laws of knowledge and of truth. Philosophyllaw, here, would
mark an absolute origin from whence the 'laws' of the knowable
would be written; designating the limit therefore, beyond which
things would be unintelligible.
And by conceiving of Philos-ophyllaw as a 'first-cause'; the
origin of truth and of knowledge, have we thereby resolved the
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question of Philosophy and of law at its most abstract? Does its
law (a self-law) simply mark it as the ma(r)ker of the laws of
what is knowable? Self-cause as the 'law ofthe law', writing itself,
and therefore writing itself beyond question; beyond doubt or
further discussion - immutable. Philosophy/law as absolute
arbiter of truth and knowledge. End of story(?)
Would this be the necessary conclusion? Is it a satisfactory
resolution? Is there 'truly' nothing more to discuss on the law of
the laws of truth and ofknowledge? No room left from which to
question intelligibly this abstract conception of the law/
Philosophy; since it designates absolutely the limits beyond which
things are unintelligible? Or does something more happen when
a limit is drawn? Is not the space of the beyond precisely opened
up? A site of absolute difference; complete otherness. And is this
not specifically the space from which discussion may begin?

Discussing the Law of Law...
We begin, then, with a proposition; an announcement of the
law that pronounces that: ~t its most abstract, the law designates a
limit beyond which things are unintelligible: Yet, it seems impossible
to even begin discussing this statement without in some way
translating it; transforming it through a series of our own
designations. We would need to, for example, delineate what
law 'at its most abstract' connotes, along with delimiting what
constitutes the 'intelligible'. In so doing, the proposition becomes
re-configured, re-ordered in order to be elucidated, or illuminated,
in the first instance - made legible ... perhaps intelligible? And
the idea of'translation' here is translated as: 'the action ofchanging
one thing to another form'; 'bearing something, from one place
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to another'; 'the expression of one thing, in other terms': And
here, it is critical to note that the change that is necessarily involved
in translation is not j~st any type of shift; without parameters,
without limits. A translation after all is not a restoration or a
duplication - a movement which carries us back to an identical
location; a reproduction of exact sameness. Indeed, the idea of
translation always involves the idea of difference; the separation
from an 'original'/origin. But then, neither is translation simply
alteration either. To constitute itself as a translation it must still
bear a resemblance to its original. Its connection must remain
recognisable; communicable, else it would simply become
distinct; a totally separate entity. What, however, allows
translation? What bestows the order of semblance between two
entities that are necessarily different? What guarantees the safe
journey here, ofone thing to its recognisable, translated other? A
set of rules, or a code of ordering? A law? But we seemed to have
travelled in a circle; to translate is to transform according to a
code or an order ~ however, what determines the movements of
this ordering? A higher level ofordering? Another law? An infinite
order of laws?
To begin then, we have had to translate. But, in so doing,
it appears that we have enacted our very opening propositionthat we can only proceed by enacting what it designates - to
impose a law, a set ofrules, which would both confine, and define
our discussion, allowing its shape to emerge in the very sketching
ofthis boundary. Would this necessity, then, gesture at the 'truth'
of such a proposition? And would this thereby constitute it as a
'Law' - a principle? That is: 'Is it a 'truth'fLaw that things must
be ordered under a law/rule, in order that they become intelligible,
comprehensible, knowable?' But this movement already seems
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to presuppose another 'layer'lorder of law - our acceptance that
intelligibility or knowledge is constituted by a series oforderings
or laws would suggest that we are already subject to a certain
conception of what knowledge is. It writes itself: therefore, as a
'Theory of Knowledge'; another tier of law we know as
Philosophy.

And certainly it would seem that much of Western
Philosophy has been compelled under the 'truth' of this
conception of knowledge - to further this 'truth', by seeking out
and delineating the laws of this law, and the rules this 'truth'
would engender - from Plato's Forms to Kanes Pure Categories
of the Understanding, from Hegefs self-conscious Spirit to the
structures derived from the theories of Semiotics. Indeed, the
history ofWestern Epistemology can be read as the quest to locate
and name, ever more dearly and precisely, the laws circumscribing
intelligibility and knowledge. A.]. Ayer writes)
The theory of knowledge discovers what it is in our power to
know.... It aims ... at establishing criteria for knowledge; criteria
which may possibly set limits to what can be known (Ayer 1973:
1).

For Ayer, then, defining the laws of knowledge could also set the
limits of knowledge. But what is pertinent to recognise here is
that a· boundary or a limit does not describe an absolute totality.
Rather, its marking circumscribes a finitude - a finitude that
emerges only against the background of its o~her; the space of
the beyond, that lurks outside the confines of its perimeter. In
this way; then, highlighting the limits of knowledge would also
serve to throw it up against its other; the unintelligible and
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incomprehensible that haunts the regions beyond the bounds of
knowledge. Yet, we may ask: 'Can we know with any positive
assurance from within the boundaries of our fully contained
knowledge, even this much of the beyond? That it is indeed
unknowable?' The laws of logic would seem to dictate both the
affirmation and denial of the question posed: 'Certainly there
would only be the unintelligible beyond the intelligible' ... and
yet ... 'How could we know so much about what we can not
know?' There appears to be an ill-logic in' the logic at work here.
A logic that Foucault derides as a 'philosophy of representation'
(1977: 172); a linear logic which conceives of truth as 'located in
the pure presence ofthe origin or originalobject (Foucault 1977:
143). Knowledge, here, would be determined as the most accurate
reflection or representation of such an original. However, this
conception of knowledge creates a necessary blind-spot at the
limiting site of its origin -like the specular surface of-reflection,
this logic ofrepresentation must itseifdisappear in order to reflect
at all. This limit, therefore, which the law marks, becomes its
own erasure; a boundary which can not bound itself - a 'spa~e'
of non-law (Derrida 1980). A place which is neither knowable,
nor unknowable.... Is this intelligible? We seem to have arrived
at a dead end.
But what has compelled us here? The quest for the law of
the laws of knowledge; the task of Philosophy itself? And what
will be the limit ofthis venture? Will it he the horizon ofcomplete
knowing? The attainment and containment ofall laws and truths
defining knowledge? Yet, we have visited this space before. After
all, hasn't Kant already articulated the limits of Reason?
Pronounced and deduced with clarity, all the a priori, and
therefore fundamental categories of our understanding, which
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order the possiblejudgements that our faculty ofknowledge may
bring to bear on its intuitions, .in an act of the understanding
(Kant 1929). And hasn't Hegel already circumscribed Absolute
Knowledge? Exposed its historical and dialectical movement as
the process ofconsciousness; moving from its original, sensuous
immediacy as 'self-certainty', through its recognition of 'self
through difference and otherness in the stage of Reason, to the
ultimate level of his own writing as Absolute Knowledge, which
apprehends through the sum of the previous two moments of
knowing -:- both in and for itself (Hegel 1977). Where, then,
does that leave us - and Philosophy subsequent to them? Beyond
them? ,,'. Is this Intelligible?
We seem to have stumbled upon another conundrum posed
by the idea of law and the limit it designates. Here, we are
concerned with the sense of law as an invariable principle; an
eternal truth, and therefore the order of philosophy itself. The
announcement of the law, here, would seem to write itself as the
historical closure; the final resolution or configuration of a
problem posed. The pronouncement of this eternal truth or
timeless principle, then) would seem to evoke an a-temporal space,
and the marking of this law would bind the place of an arrested
time -an eternal efficacy. Beyond this temporal limit, however,
rages its other - the flux of history itself; an unknowable future.
But it is not just a simple opposition that we have highlighted
here, between the eternal and the contingent, but rather, a nagging
tension between the positing, and acceptance ofa law as an eternal
truth, and impossibility of guaranteeing that it will not prove to
be contingent upon history. Again we seem to be confronted by
an impossible beyond; a future we cannot know, but which we
yet predict with the pronouncement of our laws themselves as
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immutable. But how do we accept and hold a law or principle to
be true at any particular present, ifwe cannot know with absolute
certainty that it will remain so - other than through an act of
faith(?) Is this tortuous ambivalence acceptable? Is the naming
of truth/law here still intelJigible? Are we at another dead end?
Perhaps another order oflaw is required here to ensure a safe and
legible journey from this place. But what is left? ... God? ...
Absolute Truth? Is this just semantics? Has it all been semantics?
Certain ideas that emerge from the corpus of Michel
Foucault's work, on the relations between truth, history, and
knowledge, seem to proffer a possible route through this
conundrum. l He has suggested that there are no laws that are
immutable or 'absolute', and. truth therefore should not be
regarded as an 'eternal' principle (Foucault 1977: 152). Rather,
it should be recognised as contingent upon a certain code of
knowledge; an order ofthings, inscribed in the discursive practices
of a particular place. That is,
Truth is a thing ofthis world: it is produced by virtue ofmultiple
forms ofconstraints.... Each society has its regimes of truth, its
'general politics' of truth: that is the types of discourse which it
accepts and makes function as the true (Foucault 1980: 131).

Here, then, in the absellce of an absolute or primordial truth,
the concept oflaw exists only as the idea ofsubjection to a regime;
a set of rules or codes. And this imposition wpuld not be the
result ofan order ofnecessity; 'the certainty ofabsolutes' (Foucault
1977: 153), but, rather, is maintained by the force of powerrelations. According to this Foucauldian position, then, law at
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its most abstract is inherently authoritarian and, therefore, also
violent:
Rules are empty in themselves, violent and unfinalised; they are
impersonal and can be bent to any purpose ... humanity installs
each of its violence in a system of rules and thus proceeds from
domination to domination (Foucault 1977: 151).

In this schema, then, truth and knowledge become critical
movements- which serve to disguise this fundamental violence,
legitimate it, and therefore enhance it. Truth, here, can be
presented simply as 'the ensemble of rules according to which
the true and the false are separated' (Foucault 1980: 132). It
determines the validity of things, and thus also the hierarchy of
values. This function of truth, therefore, is a manifestation of
power, but it cycles back into the economy ofpower-relations by
explicitly n~ming the values that determine the form of power in
the first instance. Foucault describes this:
Truth is linked in a circular relation with systems ofpower which
produce and sustain it, and to the effects of power which it
induces and which extend it (Foucault 1980: 133).

Knowledge, too, is strategically invested in this schema ofpowerrelations; conceived as the 'table' according tolon which things
are ordered and encoded; the 'field of coordination and
subordination of statements in which concepts appear, and are
defined, applied and transformed' (Foucault 1972: 182-183).
Knowledge, here, would partake in regimenting all conceptions;
categorising all things, ,[to] organise the play of affirmations and
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negations, establish the legitimacy of resemblance within
representations, and guarantee the objectivity and operations of
concepts' (Foucault 1977: 186). It would, thus, determine the
order of truth, and power itself. In this way, then, we could
conceive that,
Knowledge and power are integrated with one another.... It is
not possible for power to be exercised without knowledge, it is
impossible for knowledge not to engender power (Foucault
1980: 52).

Accordingly, a discourse is no longer compelled by some external
motive force - an ideology or absolute truth - but, rather, emerges
just as the interrelations of power, knowledge, and truth.
It seems, then, that the Foucauldian position we have
described conceives of the relations between truth, knowledge,
and power as the determining flux of a self-engendering, se1fenhancing cycle; an immanent flow of forces that keeps itself
vital. Here, however, the cycling schema of discourse, with its
immanent forces that appear capable of perpetuating itself
eternally, does not thereby re-inscribe a new 'kind' ofimmutability
or immunity froin extraneous sources. We can understand this
by recognising the movements of discourse as engendering nOt
only the boundary that circumscribes and determines a culture,
a system of beliefs and values, but also, most importantly, as
marking the limit-site of its own possible transgression. Foucault
describes this notion:
The limit and transgression depend on each other for whatever
density ofbeing they possess: a limit could not exist if it were
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absolutely uncrossable and, reciprocally, transgression would be
pointless if it merely crossed a limit composed of illusions and
shadows (Foucault 1977: 34).

According to this construal, then, the limit exists in its challenge
to be transgressed, and transgression derives its sense of being in
its moment of confront~tionwith the limit. But this relationship
is not conceived as the simple movement ofa linear breach which
takes us from within the ordered confines of the limit into its
dual opposition, the site of an anarchic and limitless 'beyond'.
Indeed the aporia of the 'beyond' that 'we articulated previously
is circumvented in this Foucauldian schema; the relations oftruth
and knowledge here is not subject to the linear logic we presented
in our opening discussion. That is,
Transgression ... is not related to the limit as black to white, the
prohibited to the lawful, the outside to the inside, or as the
open area of a building to its enclosed spaces. Rather, their
relationship takes the form ofa spiral which no simple infraction
can exhaust (Foucault 1977: 35).

The limit therefore does not exhaust truth/knowledge; its breach
will not be the end of intelligibility. Rather, the moment of
transgression is the moment that would write a new order of
things. We move, therefore, not from truth to untruth, knowledge
into the unknown, but from one discourse of truth to another, a
moment of pure violence - a complete rupture that imposes a
new'law, a new discourse of truth, knowledge, and power.
This spiralling, transgressive movement of truth and
knowledge, then, presents us with an alternative conception of
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philosophy; one written against a certain traditional, linear
metaphysics that 'designated the separation between the
simulacrum on one side and the original perfect copy on the
other' (Foucault 1977: 171). This 'representational model' of
knowledge conceives truth as the ideal of re-establishing a unity
with thisoriginary, and therefore p'erfect object, and knowledge
therefore would be completely and unilaterally dependant on
this site ofthe origin. This endeavour, however, seems necessarily
doomed to failure; its logic is inherently contradictory. That is,
although the identity of the origin and original is upheld as the
goal for knowledge, it is an identity that must also remain
ultimately beyond reach - else knowledge cannot arise. This is
because knowledge is always already a translation - always a
knowledge of-and thus requires a 'space' for reflection. The
attainment ofcomplete identity or absolute unity with the originl
original here would collapse this space; there would be no possible
room for 'knowledge' - all we would have is the holism of being
this identity. Knowledge requires that the origin be left, in order
to begin. And this necessary gap, this space of difference rent by
knowledge, would seem to resist the possibility of a complete
translation, a total reduction to sameness. Indeed, any attempt
at such appropriation can only violate the very notion ofdifference
itself - otherness cannot be made identical with sameness, else
all we would have is more ofthe same..It is, therefore, a movement
of contradiction. The goal of the 'representational model' of
philosophy therefore, to locate truth as an absolute identit)T, does
not seem coherent. Further, it is a move that seems either
redundant, or impossible, for how would we identify an answer
to be absolutely correct uI)less we already knew what that answer
was? Yet, what would ensure an adequate translation if not the
ideal of the origin/original? What grants knowledge of identity?

163

Dos Santos-Lee

According to our Foucauldian position it is nothing more concrete
than the relations of differences inscribed within a system or
discourse; the origin is no longer primary: \X'hat we begin with is
already a 'copy'; a translation. Yet neither do we simply have
chaos either. The categories and laws traditionally conceived of
as ordering knowledge and logic have not thereby evaporated,
rather, it would seem that these acts of encoding and ordering
are all we do have -- with nothing further behind, or beyond
them -- guaranteeing them; there are no 'absolute axes ofreference
... no privilege to any centre (Foucault 1972: 205). The law here,
therefore, can be seen to designate the limit which defines
knowledge, truth and the intelligible in a particular discourse.
But, here, the limit also marks itself as a site that is infinitely
transgressible. What lies beyond, then, is not the unintelligible,
but the space for new concepts and new thought itself.
This Foucauldian concepcion of truth, knowledge, and
discourse appears to have resolved the problems we originally
faced of vicious regress with the concept of the limit and its
beyond. Have we, theecb}', negotiated safely through the dead
ends that we confronted? What manner of space 'beyond' do we
now find ourselves? According to our Foucauldian schema we
would be in a new discourse of truth and knowledge -- and
presumably (if we were truly convinced) our acceptance of the
validity of this thesis would compel us into the very framework
and practice of its own regime of truth -- till it, too, were
transgressed.
And this immanent, conceptual web that is embodied by
our construal of the Foucauldian position appears decidedly
tenacious; its logic doubles onto itself to provide an almost
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hermetic seal. It proves resilient against the criticisms oftraditional
logic which may ask: 'If truth, knowledge, and power are
conceived as contingent, arbitrary, and essentially dependant upon
each other, then what allows this thesis on the 'order ofdiscourse'
to be more viable than any other theory?' Certainly Foucault
himselfdoes not ever offer an explicit answer to this question; he
never directly justifies why we should accept his view - he cannot
without contradicting his own thesis on the contingency between
truth, order, and knowledge. Is he thereby saying nothing?
Certainly we must recognise that Foucault is not attempting to
provide a theory of 'epistemological causality' here (Foucault
1994: xiii); a teleological expository that would impose a rigid
configuration on 'what knowledge must be', or what an 'adequate
theory' must logically 'prove'. Indeed, for Foucault, the point
precisely is that there are no laws, or truths, that can vouchsafe
the identity of these relations definitively; this would be his point
of departure. He states,
my discourse, far from determining the locus in which it speaks,
is avoiding the ground on which it could find support. It is a
discourse about discourses: but it is not trying to find in them a
hidden law, a concealed origin that it only remains to free; nor
is it trying to establish by itself, taking itself as a starting-point,
the general theory of which they would be the concrete models
(Foucault 1972: 205).

The logic of the original criticism, therefore, can only miss
Foucault's point. It becomes its own blind-spot, since ,its logic is
precisely what is being criticised. As a reproach against the
Foucauldian position, therefore, it seems ineffectual; it does not
communicate at all, refusing to negotiate the thesis on the table
of its own logic.

Dos Santos-Lee

Yet, something remains troubling about the Foucauldian
'theory of discourse'. Here, however, it is not so much the
weakness of its argument, but rather its strength that remains
problematic. That is, although the Foucauldian position
maintains that concepts, and thoughts, should be ever new and
creative - achievable in moments of transgression, rupture and
transformation - it remains difficult to imagine how we can
transgress this doubly bound, hermetically sealed limit of the
Foucauldian logic. How do we overcome the sub-structure of
power/knowledge relations that defines all its forces as arising
immanently? How do we transgress the limit of this Foucauldian
thesis that has its own supercession and transgression written
into it? Can we escape the total envelopment of its thesis? Here,
it is perhaps the 'wholeness' ofthe Foucauldian logic that remains
problematic - it still highlights the limit from within; giving one
the sense ofbeing on the inside of a balloon. The conundrum of
the limit does not seem to have been truly dissipated here; we
have simply been relocated into the volume of a discourse, rather
than being on one side of the linear plane of reflection. The
problem ofthe beyond, here, remains intact. The volume, which
accommodates the structural complex of inter-relations that
delimits a discou-rse, would just mark a further level of ordering
beyond the merely reflective surface of a plane. This movement,
therefore, has not truly dislodged us from the dead end of our
original problem, nor from the linear logic of the limit and its
infinite regress in the orders of law. And, indeed, there is the
sense ofan 'immutable law' disguised in this Foucauldian concept
of discourse. Here, although the thesis affirms that culture and
theory, power and knowledge afe 'contingent', it seems to allude
to the mode of their interrelationship as 'necessary'. But it is not
possible to assert the necessity of this ordering or relationship
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without resorting to some higher order of guarantee. And in his
earlier writings Foucault does do this through his idea of the
episteme - the 'pure experience of order and its modes of being'
(Foucault 1994: xx). He writes,
the fact, in short [is] that order exists.... This middle region ...
in so far as it makes manifest the modes of being of order, can
be posited as the most fundamental of all: anterior to words,
perceptions, and gestures (Foucault 1994: xx-xxi).

This idea of the episterne, construed as an 'archaeological device'
- in that it ~oes not serve to justify anyone particular discourse
- appears to r~main here, universal and immutable in its own
right. And although Foucault's later work does not explicitly rely
on the idea of the episteme, the very nature of his idea of the
'regime oftruth' still seems to presuppose an underlying order of
relations; a fundamental skeleton on which the ,qualitative
relations of discourse are slung. Verily, then, although the
Foucauldian thesis on the schema of discourse recognises and
tries to address the paradox that seems necessarily to follow upon
the idea of law and truth, it does not seem to escape completely
from positing its own law in order to articulate and circumvent
this very paradox. The conundrum of the law and its limit
therefore - with its seemingly infinite regress of orders - is
regenerated here, nonetheless.
So where are we left then? Irredeemably stuck at this dead
end, with no place to go? Or is there a possible detour yet? In his
paper 'Force ofLaw' (Derrida 1992) Derrida discusses the same
aporetic relations between law, legitimacy, limits, foundations,
and truth. His strategy, however, is very d~f~erent. Unlike
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Foucault, Derrida does not offer an explicit or definite thesis of
knowledge or philosophy. Indeed, his method, which has come
to be known as (D)econstruction,alludes to the impossibility of
such a move. Instead, it proceeds by invading other texts and
theories so as to complicate and destabilise, and therefore
question, the very foundations of its authori~ This method allows
Derrida to remain conscious at all times that his own writing is
not immune from such an endeavour. Deconstruction, after all,
'deconstructs it-self (Derrida 1991: 274). Thus he writes,
[A] deconstructive interrogation ... is neither foundationalist
nor anti-foundationalist. Nor does it pass up opportunities to
put into question or even to exceed the possibility or the ultimate
necessity of questioning, of the questioning form of thought,
interrogating without assurance or prejudice the very history of
the question and of its philosophical authorir,r. For there is an
authority - and so a legitimate force in the questioning form of
which one might ask oneself whence it derives such great force
in our tradition (Derrida 1992: 8).

Thus, where the Foucauldian position posits the mode of
'thinking problematically' - questioningly, as a possible 'answer
to the question [of Philosophy]' (Foucault 1977: 185), and
therefore the law, Derrida would question questioning itself
(Derrida 1982: xvi). And, here, there is no resolution proffered.
Indeed, he would want to re-pose the question - to keep it in
'1
pay,' to
transform and deplace its statement ... towar-d examining the
presuppositions of the question, the incitation of its protocol,
the"laws ofits proced.ure, the headings ofits alleged homogeJ:lei~
of its apparent unicity (Derrida 1982: xvii).
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To throw into question, therefore, the very law of the law; which
has traditionally been embodied by Philosophy ~ the authoritative
voice par excellence.
In the paper, 'Force ofLaw' (Derrida 1992), then, Derrida
takes us on an excursus of this question. Here, he agrees with
Foucault that the law is fundamentally violent; it imposes its
authority in an act of complete rupture, with no preceding or
superimposed legitimacy. At the limit which articulates its origin,
therefore, we are confronted by a paradox; a moment of nonlaw, non-Iegitimac~ He writes,
Its very moment of foundation or institution (which in any
case is never a" moment inscribed in the homogenous tissue ofa
history, since itis ripped apart with one decision), the operation
that amounts to founding, inaugurating, justifying law, making
law, would consist of a coup deforce, of a performative and
therefore interpretative violence that in itself is neither just nor
unjust and that no justice and no previous law with its founding
anterior moment could guarantee or contradict or invalidate
(Derrida 1992: 13).

And for Derrida, Philosophy names itself as this law; conceives
of itself as the master of the limit which binds and arbitrates all
truth. Yet it does so through no prior authority. Thus, it too is a
reign. of violence. He writes:
A discourse that has called itselfphilosophy - doubtless the only
discourse that has ever intended to receive its name only from
itself ... h~s always ... meant to say its limit..... It has recognised,
conceived, posited, declined the limit according to all possible
modes; and therefore by the same token, in order better to
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dispose of the limit, has transgressed it. Its own limit had not to
remain foreign to it. Therefore it has appropriated the concept
for itself; it has believed that it controls the margin ofits volume
and that it thinks its other (Derrida 1982: x).

Yet crucially, although Derrida recognises that law and philosophy
must necessarily be violent, he also recognises that they cannot
simply be just that either; the idea oflaw is not equivalent to pure
force or power - this relation cannot be equilibrated, even in the
cyclical, co-determining schema of the Foucauldian 'regime of
truth'. There cannot be a perfect economy here with no residue
or excess, since if this were the case then there would be no need
for the idea of law or philosophy. Law, here, would simply be
reduced to mere coercion, and philosophy as illegitimate could
only ever be banal. What Derrida will suggest, then, is that in
order for law to be law it must· speak in the name of justice, and
similarly, for philosophy to be philosophy it must speak in the
name of Truth. Here, the moment of truth and justice must
remain a necessary moment ofotherness - an excess that prevents
law and philosophy from becoming reducible to pure force or
authority. It is a moment of 'undecidability' - of differance;
meaning that is infinitely deferred, and infinitely differing. In
this way, then, truth, law, knowledge and power cannot be
completely equilibrated in the economy of a discourse. This is
where Derrida differs from Foucault; the Foucauldian thesis seems
to attempt to dispel the problem of the origin of law, by reinscribing it into a cycle of immanent generation, from the
relations of truth, knowledge, and power. For Derrida, however,
this tension is deliberately kept in play; the problematic origin
and foundations of law and philosophy are not to be
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circumvented, but, rather are maintained as paradoxical and
~ystical- undecidable. He describes this idea:
The undecidable is not merely the oscillation or tension between
tWO decisions; it is the experience of that which, though
heterogeneous, foreign to the order of the calculable and the
rule, is still obliged - it is ofobligation that we must speak - to
give itself up to the impossible decision (Derrida 1992: 24).

The moment of paradox that is presented here is not simply the
movement of oscillation between necessary, contradictory
extremes, but rather is intensified to the moment of the
'impossible decision' that obviously cannot be made, and yet must
be. This, then, is the idea of law and philosophy; the paradox of
an 'impossible necessity' that conjoins the contradictory moments
of both, violence and justice, self-named authority and truth.
These moments are opposed to each other, and yet are necessarily
implicated together. This is the double movement; of
impossibility and yet necessity - undecidability (Derrida 1992:
19). It is marked as the space of conjunction; an 'and' that both
separates and conjoins (Derrida 1992: 3) - that, like the
Foucauldian position, writes itself against the either/or of linear
metaphysics and binary oppositions, and resists the fixity of an
absolute identity. Yet here, in this space of the Derridean
undecidable, the limit no longer remains a dean boundary whether as the boundary between opposite identities, or the space
that is simply traversed to write a new order ofthings. The 'logic'
of knowledge, truth and philosophy here is compelled neither
merely transcendentally, nor immanently. Rather it appears to
be inscribed as an impossible space that cannot be articulated,
and yet must be. He writes,
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Can one pass this singular limit which is not a limit, which no
more separates the inside form the outside than it assures their
permanent and transparent continuity? (Derrida 1982: xvi)

For Derrida, then, the limit marks the site where 'the undecidable
remains caught, lodged at least as a ghost - but an essential ghost
- in every decision, in every event of decision' (Derrida 1992:
24). No simple or direct transgression is possible here; it is a
space that remains neither simply inside nor outside, yet both
inside and outside - like a wall or a frame that exists as the
contradictory contamination of the two. The limit, therefore,
remains an aporia that cannot simply be resolved or overcome,
passed over, or passed through. Derrida, therefore, prefers to
occupy its margins in order to interrogate the margin; to reveal
the impossible closure that the limit tries to inscribe, whether as
law or as the authoritative voice ofphilosophy. That is, his writings
in fact ask the question of the margin. Gnawing away at the
border which would make this question into a particular case ...
to blur the line which separates a text from its controlled
margin.... [To] interrogate philosophy beyond its meaning,
treating it not only as a discourse but as a determined text
inscribed in a general text, enclosed in the representation of its
own margin (Derrida 1982: xxiii).

Derrida's writing, therefore, remains infinitely self-conscious;
questioning the margin, yet ever conscious of its own necessary
marking. It doubles and re-doubles on itself to resist any kind of
resolution - even the tensive 'unity' articulated in Foucault's
power-knowledge relations. The tension between lawltruth, force/
power and the limit is not ever dissipated here; never reabsorbed
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into the movement ofthe discourse that uses the law to reinforce,
force. The limit is neither completely dosed, nor completely
breached; the law and philosophy cannot ever fully justify itself,
and yet, it must assume this integrity; as law, it can only assume
it. The paradox is kept in play here; our aporia or dead end
remains. Yet, this does not mean that we have nowhere to move,
instead, we are confronted with an infinite set of deferrals and
detours; a movement of diffirance (Derrida 1982: 1-29) - the
experience ofimpossibility and undecidability itself And, indeed,
Derrida will suggest that all these dead ends have been one and
the same, that, 'in fact there is only one aporia, only one potential
aporetic that infinitely distributes itself (Derrida 1992: 22). It
manifests itself at the site of the limit, as the aporia of uncaused,
cause; the 'law of the law', as a law without law - a Philosophy
that names itself- translations with no origins.

Notes
I am not attempting to present a detailed critique or exposition
of the works of Michel Foucault here. Rather, I simply intend
to borrow various ideas that emerge from the source of his
writings to establish a possible philosophical position, which I
refer to as 'Foucauldian'.
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